Indo-China Border dispute- II

The difference between the India and China on border widened during the second half of the 1950s when China published her maps depicting “a large part of our North- East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts as Chinese territory”. Zhou held that the entire boundary had never been formally delimited by any treaty or agreement and averred that Aksai Chin had always been under Chinese jurisdiction; only recently had India laid claim to it.

Also Read: Indo-China Border dispute- I

He categorically refused to accept the MacMohan Line as it was a product of British imperialism and was illegal though he found it necessary to take “a more or less realistic attitude” towards the Line.

This development along with border clashes caused a mixed feeling of anger, despair and surprise in India. Nehru was not prepared to accept any large claim on the vast area along the border. It was felt that having given evasive answers about maps and assuring that the Chinese accepted the MacMohan Line Beijing was not playing fair. China’s claims implied that they wanted to establish presence in the Indian side of the Himalayan border which, it was held, would greatly endanger India’s basic security.

The relationship between India and China deteriorated sharply in 1959 following the rebellion in Tibet and India’s grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama with consequence that by the summer of 1959, the two sides faced each other along a contested border in NEFA. China repeated its position in 1960 during Zhou’s visit to India when it expressed the need to negotiate entire boundary with both the countries maintaining the status quo.

The Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, conveyed an expression that a new Line could be agreed upon after joint surveys not very different from the MacMohan Line. But, by this time, the feeling of Chinese betrayal and duplicity had become so condensed in India that it was feared that any concession to China would only encourage the Chinese to press even more ambitious claims later.

Nehru’s resentment was based on two grievances- China never objected to India’s maps and it extended its sway in Ladakh after the dispute became public in 1959. In 1961, N. Delhi adopted the “Forward Policy” establishing a military presence in the disputed Aksai Chin area. China’s military response came in Oct. 1962.

The short war ended when Beijing declared a unilateral ceasefire on Nov. 21 and withdrew to positions 20 km. behind the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that existed in 1959. The War belied Nehru’s unrealistic perception of war in the context of balance of power which evaded the concept of limited war and expected other countries to act as counterbalance to China in a possibility of war.

After the War, talks between the countries started in 1981 at the level of officials and ambassador level exchanges were restored in 1976. Since then, four agreements have been concluded on the boundary question:

i) Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas on Sept. 7, 1993;

ii) Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the military field along the LOAC on Nov. 26, 1996;

iii) A Declaration of Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation on Jan. 23, 2003; and,

iv)  An agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Indo-China Boundary Question on April 11, 2005. But progress for settlement of the border issue has not been satisfactory for a number of reasons.

It is a fact that China has borders with fourteen nations and has settled border issues with all of them excluding India on the basis of mutual concession and accommodation. The Chinese approach to the boundary disputes is based on the premise that only political leaders can accomplish this objective.

They simply laid down procedures for carrying out deals made earlier politically- with Myanmar on Jan. 28, 1960; Nepal on Mar. 21, 1960; Pakistan on Mar. 2, 1963; Mongolia on Mar. 26, 1963; Afghanistan on Nov. 22, 1963; the Soviet Union on May 16, 1991; Kazakhstan on April 26, 1994; Russia on Jan. 28, 1994; Bhutan on Dec. 8, 1998; Vietnam on Dec. 25, 2000; and Russia finally on Oct. 25, 2004, and June 2, 2005. On July 21, 2008, China and Russia settled the last disputed points, namely, two islands at the confluence of the Amer and Ussuri rivers.

But the within the Chinese establishment, there is a doubt about the will and ability of the Indian authorities to negotiate a border deal and then sell it to the public.

At present, it is a fact that neither of the two countries can afford to engage in a full fledged war on the border issue but at the same time while China, due to its geo-strategic location, is in a position to cause enormous problems in Kashmir, the Uttar Pradesh border, Sikkim, Arunanchal Pradesh and Assam, a pro-Independent Tibetan policy actively pursued by India can create highly embarrassing situation for China internally and globally both.

An important development in this context is the need felt by both the countries to improve overall climate before seeking to resolve the vexed question of the border-demarcation which has paved the way for initiation and enhancement of cultural, educational and scientific exchanges while, economically, China has emerged as the largest trading partner of India.

On the border issue too both the parties have agreed upon the idea of a comprehensive package settlement encompassing all the sectors and work towards a political agreement avoiding excessive focus on historical claims and legal niceties. It is obvious that in a democratically functioning country like India, an environment conducive to border settlement is inevitable which itself requires evolution of political consensus followed by education of the public so as to make it acceptable on the basis of rational calculations.

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Dr Dinesh Sharma is presently working as an Assistant Professor in Political Science at Government Degree College, Champawat, Uttarakhand and has been teaching at under-graduate and post-graduate levels for the last several years. Dr. Sharma has participated in a number of seminars, conferences and workshops and has presented many research papers in the same. The developments in the fields of Indian Political System and the International Relations are of particular interest to him.